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SICK AND TIRED OF HEARING ABOUT THE DAMN
BATHROOMS
COLIN POCHIE?
For the past several years, courts have struggled to reconcile discrimi-
nation against transgender employees and students with Title VII and Title 
IX sex-stereotyping jurisprudence.1 But why? After all, sex divisions are 
commonplace throughout work and school life: in school, we undergo sex 
education in classrooms segregated by gender;2 in the workplace, men are 
rarely required to wear makeup, while women are often encouraged to do 
so;3 and in both settings, we use segregated restrooms designated for our 
gender.4 In these instances, we abide by some intrinsic stereotype of what 
distinguishes one gender as patently different from another.5 Yet we reject 
this separate-but-equal ideology in other instances—like when a woman is 
denied a promotion because she does not present femininely enough.6 The 
? J.D. Candidate, Chicago-Kent College of Law Class of 2018. Managing Editor, Chicago-Kent Law 
Review. This Note is dedicated foremost to the countless trans women, men, and nonbinary people 
without whose work this Note would not exist. I would like to thank Professor Katharine K. Baker 
whose unparalleled intellect and firm guidance constantly pushed me to ask more of myself and this 
Note; Professor Kevin Lyles, whose robust instruction led me to law school in the first place; and 
Micah, without whose priceless companionship and saintly patience I would be lost.
1. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2012)); see also
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1688 (2012).
2. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.34(a)(3) (2017) (permitting separation of human sexuality classes by 
gender).
3. E.g., Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1106 (9th Cir. 2006) (in which a 
casino imposed a dress policy which required female bartenders to wear makeup but forbade male 
bartenders from doing so).
4. See Kate Wheeling, Stalled Out: How Social Bias is Segregating America’s Bathrooms, PAC.
STANDARD (Aug. 4, 2017), https://psmag.com/magazine/how-social-bias-is-segregating-americas-
bath-
rooms?utm_content=bufferd3a46&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buf
fer [https://perma.cc/R9UF-BX9F] (tracing the history of segregated restrooms).
5. See KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS 146, 152–54 
(2007) (listing gender stereotypes and describing them as “perceptions rather than realities about traits 
held by men and women”); see also JULIA T. WOOD, GENDERED LIVES: COMMUNICATION, GENDER,
AND CULTURE 23–27 (9th ed. 2011) (discussing learned gender roles and stating that they are “neither 
innate nor necessarily stable” but rather “defined by society”).
6. E.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 228 (1989) (in which a woman was denied 
a promotion for not acting sufficiently effeminate); see Katharine K. Baker, The Stories of Marriage, 12 
J.L. & FAM. STUD. 1, 18 (2010) (describing opposition to same-sex marriage as supporting “separate 
but equal gender roles”). This Note uses the phrase “separate but equal” to refer to the phenomenon of 
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student at the center of the Gloucester case, the struggle to access appropri-
ate facilities culminated in “two public meetings, inviting the community to 
discuss [his] genitals and restroom usage in front of reporters and television 
cameras,” from which he “continue[s] to suffer daily because of the school 
board’s decision to make [his] bathroom use a matter of public debate.”15
For transgender students then, the unique burden of gender identity denial 
elevates stereotype-based school action from tolerable to onerous. To vin-
dicate the rights of transgender students under the current Title IX regime, 
courts must reconcile the tension between sex-stereotyping theory and the 
statutory approval of communal biases by evaluating the psychological, 
dignitary, and physical harms borne by transgender students under a syn-
thesized burdens-balancing test.16
A transgender person is typically understood to be someone whose 
gender identity—both parts social construct and internal perception of be-
ing a man, woman, or gender-nonconforming person—is different from the 
sex assigned to that person at birth.17 This stands in contrast with a cis-
gender person, whose sex-at-birth and gender identity are congruent.18
Often, a transgender individual’s experience is marked by the condition 
“gender dysphoria,” which the American Psychiatric Association defines as 
a continuous incongruence between a transgender person’s “ex-
pressed/experienced gender and the gender others would assign” them.19 In
many cases, this results in a desire to “be treated as [another] gender or to 
be rid of one’s sex characteristics,” among other things.20 While not neces-
sitated in all instances, this tension may involve significant psychological 
distress.21 This can be mitigated by positive socialization, which includes 
15. Gavin Grimm, Opinion, I’m Transgender and Can’t Use the Student Bathroom. The Supreme 
Court Could Change That, WASH. POST (Oct. 27, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/im-transgender-and-cant-use-the-student-bathroom-the-
supreme-court-could-change-that/2016/10/27/19d1a3ae-9bc1-11e6-a0ed-
ab0774c1eaa5_story.html?utm_term=.4bc64562a3b4 [https://perma.cc/333U-5DWM]. See generally 
Gloucester, 822 F.3d 709.
16. Discussed infra in Part III.
17. See Transgender FAQ, GLAAD, https://www.glaad.org/transgender/transfaq 
[https://perma.cc/2Y2L-7ML2]. 
18. As defined by Oxford English Dictionary, the term “cisgender” refers to “a person whose 
sense of personal identity and gender corresponds with his or her sex at birth . . . .” Cisgender, OXFORD 
ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2015).
19. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, GENDER DYSPHORIA 1 (2013).
20. Id.
21. See Am. Psychological Ass’n, Guidelines for Psychological Practice with Transgender and 
Gender Nonconforming People, 70 AM. PSYCHOL. 832 (2015). See generally WORLD PROF’L ASS’N
FOR TRANSGENDER HEALTH, STANDARDS OF CARE FOR THE HEALTH OF TRANSSEXUAL,
TRANSGENDER, AND GENDER NONCONFORMING PEOPLE 61 (7th ed. 2012), 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/amo_hub_content/Association140/files/Standards%20of%20Care%20V7%2
0-%202011%20WPATH%20(2)(1).pdf [https://perma.cc/6J6J-BZMD].
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acknowledgement of one’s gender identity as well as participation in the 
common facets of that role.22 Rejection of transgender individuals’ identi-
ties often damages their mental health and self-perception.23 In some cases, 
this can contribute to a transgender individual’s self-harm or suicide.24
In recent years, heightened visibility of transgender people has in-
curred public scrutiny and aggravated rates of violence against transgender 
individuals.25 A record twenty-one transgender people were murdered in 
2015, and violent crimes motivated by gender identity nearly tripled from 
the previous year; that figure only grew in 2016.26 In response to retailer 
Target’s announcement of a transinclusive restroom policy, several cis-
gender people publicly threatened to bring weapons with them to the 
store’s restrooms.27 The Trump administration has already reversed pro-
gress on several LGBT-inclusive28 policies.29 Since rescinding its transin-
22. See Am. Psychological Ass’n, supra note 21; see also WORLD PROF’L ASS’N FOR 
TRANSGENDER HEALTH, supra note 21.
23. See Am. Psychological Ass’n, supra note 21; see also WORLD PROF’L ASS’N FOR 
TRANSGENDER HEALTH, supra note 21.
24. See ANN P. HAAS ET AL., AM. FOUND. FOR SUICIDE PREVENTION & WILLIAMS INST., SUICIDE 
ATTEMPTS AMONG TRANSGENDER AND GENDER NON-CONFORMING ADULTS 2 (2014), 
http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/AFSP-Williams-Suicide-Report-Final.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/W3WF-ECXP]; see also Fallon Fox, Leelah Alcorn’s Suicide: Conversion Therapy is 
Child Abuse, TIME (Jan. 8, 2015), http://time.com/3655718/leelah-alcorn-suicide-transgender-therapy/ 
[https://perma.cc/NLJ3-ACGD]; Lindsey Bever, Transgender Boy’s Mom Sues Hospital, Saying He 
‘Went into Spiral’ After Staff Called Him a Girl, WASH. POST (Oct. 3, 2016) 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/to-your-health/wp/2016/10/03/mother-sues-hospital-for-
discrimination-after-staff-kept-calling-her-transgender-son-a-girl/?utm_term=.0f54c98e4901 
[https://perma.cc/PY5F-BFUH].
25. See NAT’L COAL. OF ANTI-VIOLENCE PROGRAMS, LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, TRANSGENDER,
QUEER, AND HIV-AFFECTED HATE VIOLENCE IN 2016 (2017), http://avp.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/06/NCAVP_2016HateViolence_REPORT.pdf [https://perma.cc/M2E2-VM5P]; 
see also Katy Steinmetz, Why Transgender People are Being Murdered at a Historic Rate, TIME (Aug. 
17, 2015), http://time.com/3999348/transgender-murders-2015/ [https://perma.cc/6GTZ-525C]. 
26. See Zack Ford, As 2015 Sees a Record Number of Documented Transgender Murders, a 
Glimmer of Hope, THINKPROGRESS (Nov. 20, 2015, 1:00 PM), https://thinkprogress.org/as-2015-sees-
a-record-number-of-documented-transgender-murders-a-glimmer-of-hope-bb39567fc672#.kxzqtw98c 
[https://perma.cc/J98Z-RRXB]; see also Trudy Ring, Trans Woman Murdered in Alabama in Deadliest 
Year on Record, ADVOCATE (Oct. 6, 2016, 9:40 PM), 
http://www.advocate.com/transgender/2016/10/06/trans-woman-murdered-alabama-deadliest-year-
record [https://perma.cc/KV7U-PJTV].
27. Sunnivie Brydum, Right-Wingers Pledge to Carry Guns to Bathroom to Fend Off Trans 
Folks, ADVOCATE (Apr. 25, 2016, 5:32 PM), http://www.advocate.com/transgender/2016/4/25/right-
wingers-pledge-carry-guns-bathroom-fend-trans-folks [https://perma.cc/S5YA-87BU].
28. The politics surrounding how the community’s acronym is constructed and ordered are mani-
fold, and far beyond the scope of this Note. See Joy D’Souza, What is the Expanded LGBT Acronym? 
And What Does it Stand For?, HUFFINGTON POST CAN. (June 27, 2016, 11:11 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2016/06/27/entire-lgbt-acronym_n_10616392.html
[https://perma.cc/W5U5-QALT]. For simplicity’s sake, this Note uses the standard acronym “LGBT”
used by the ACLU, recognizing that that choice is inherently political as well. See generally LGBT 
Rights, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/issues/lgbt-rights [https://perma.cc/RTA5-QL25].
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clusive guidance, the Department of Education (DOE) has scaled back its 
involvement in transgender discrimination cases.30 President Trump’s ab-
rupt declaration of a ban on transgender military members also threw the 
employment and benefits status of thousands into question.31
Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell v. Hodges, the 
rights of transgender people have been the focus of substantial public de-
bate.32 Twenty-four state legislatures have attempted to pass legislation that 
would prevent transgender people from using restrooms that align with 
their gender identity.33 North Carolina in particular withstood significant 
criticism for the Public Facilities Privacy & Security Act, which attempted 
to predicate public restroom access on the sex listed on one’s birth certifi-
cate.34 Texas soon followed suit, ignoring public outcry and potential eco-
nomic damage.35 Several editorials published after the 2016 general 
election placed some blame for Hillary Clinton’s loss on transgender peo-
ple’s struggle to participate in basic facets of public life, with one column-
ist declaring that “America is sick and tired of hearing about liberals’ damn 
bathrooms.”36
29. Michael D. Shear & Charlie Savage, In One Day, Trump Administration Lands 3 Punches 
Against Gay Rights, N.Y. TIMES (July 27, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/27/us/politics/white-house-lgbt-rights-military-civil-rights-act.html 
[https://perma.cc/3WG3-VJBA].
30. Emma Brown, Education Dept. Closes Transgender Student Cases as it Pushes to Scale Back 
Civil Rights Investigations, WASH. POST (June 17, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/education-dept-closes-transgender-student-cases-as-
it-pushes-to-scale-back-civil-rights-investigations/2017/06/17/08e10de2-5367-11e7-91eb-
9611861a988f_story.html?utm_term=.8da1aacbcc68&tid=sm_tw [https://perma.cc/9KZZ-35JT].
31. Medardo Perez, Banning Transgender Troops Could Cost U.S. $960 Million, Report Says,
NBC NEWS (Aug. 15, 2017), http://www.nbcnews.com/feature/nbc-out/banning-transgender-troops-
could-cost-us-960-million-report-says-n792466 [https://perma.cc/JRP2-S6JY].
32. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015); see Scott Skinner-Thompson, How Obergefell
Could Help Transgender Rights, SLATE: OUTWARD (June 26, 2015, 2:26 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/blogs/outward/2015/06/26/obergefell_and_trans_rights_the_supreme_court_s_en
dorsement_of_identity.html [https://perma.cc/S43A-6HRM].
33. Joellen Kralik, “Bathroom Bill” Legislative Tracking, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE 
LEGISLATURES (July 28, 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/research/education/-bathroom-bill-legislative-
tracking635951130.aspx [https://perma.cc/PQC6-BAVD].
34. See Mark Abadi, North Carolina Has Lost a Staggering Amount of Money Over Its Contro-
versial “Bathroom Law,” BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 21, 2016, 3:22 PM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/north-carolina-hb2-economic-impact-2016-9 [https://perma.cc/96F5-
KGYZ].
35. Jon Herskovitz, Texas “Bathroom Bills” Stall in Special Legislative Session, REUTERS (Aug.
14, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-texas-lgbt-idUSKCN1AU15U [https://perma.cc/5P7U-
WY6L].
36. Mark Lilla, Opinion, The End of Identity Liberalism, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/20/opinion/sunday/the-end-of-identity-liberalism.html 
[https://perma.cc/553E-KC4W].
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Few institutions have borne the percolation of public anxiety over 
transgender individuals’ existence more than the education system. Cases 
like Gloucester and Whitaker have pushed courts to harmonize the rights of 
transgender students with the equality theory—to mixed results.37 Glouces-
ter stemmed from a series of “Dear Colleague” letters issued by the DOE 
and the Department of Justice (DOJ).38 Unsurprisingly, the DOE aban-
doned its transinclusive position after President Trump appointed Betsy 
DeVos as Education Secretary.39 Shortly after, the Supreme Court remand-
ed Gloucester for further proceedings—this time, without the support of 
DOE guidance.40
The plaintiffs in Gloucester relied on sex discrimination principles 
under Title IX.41 At the time, the DOE’s guidance supported this argu-
ment.42 Without the benefit of the DOE’s guidance, these arguments must 
contend with the issue of Title IX’s codification of permissible gender divi-
sions. These include, for example, schools’ ability to segregate restrooms 
and athletic teams, as well as mandate dress codes according to community 
norms.43 To secure facility equity for transgender students, courts must 
harmonize Title IX’s prohibition of sex discrimination with the reality of 
permissible gender divisions. To this end, Part I of this Note will examine 
the equality principles that underpin Title IX and Title VII jurisprudence as 
well as the codification of permissible gender stereotyping present in both. 
Part II will explore the haphazard method by which courts have applied 
these principles in the cases of transgender employees and students. Part III 
will prove that Title IX can be narrowly interpreted to protect transgender 
students despite the statute’s codification of communal biases.
37. See generally Whitaker ex rel. Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of Educ., 
858 F.3d 1034 (7th Cir. 2017); G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709 (4th Cir. 
2016), cert. granted in part, 137 S. Ct. 369 (2016), and vacated and remanded, 137 S. Ct. 1239 (2017).
38. See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER ON 
TRANSGENDER STUDENTS (2016), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201605-
title-ix-transgender.pdf [https://perma.cc/UC2A-2BJB].
39. See Sandhya Somashekhar et al., Trump Administration Rolls Back Protections for 
Transgender Students, WASH. POST (Feb. 22, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/trump-administration-rolls-back-protections-for-
transgender-students/2017/02/22/550a83b4-f913-11e6-bf01-
d47f8cf9b643_story.html?utm_term=.261034db0af6 [https://perma.cc/KL7B-UE2N].
40. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. G. G. ex rel. Grimm, 137 S. Ct. 1239 (2017) (mem.).
41. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 23–25, G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 
F.3d 709 (4th Cir. 2016) (No. 15-2056).
42. See generally Gloucester, 822 F.3d 709.
43. See 28 C.F.R. § 54.410 (2016) (concerning restrooms and locker rooms); see also Hayden ex 
rel. A.H. v. Greensburg Cmty. Sch. Corp., 743 F.3d 569, 581–82 (7th Cir. 2014) (“[S]ex-differentiated 
standards consistent with community norms may be permissible to the extent they are part of a compre-
hensive, evenly-enforced grooming code that imposes comparable burdens on both males and females 
alike.”).
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I. THE INTERNAL CONFLICT OF TITLE IX SEX DISCRIMINATION
PROHIBITION
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 mandates that “[n]o 
person . . . shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be 
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any educa-
tion program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”44 In gen-
eral, a person alleging a Title IX violation must show: that they were 
excluded from participation in an education program because of their sex; 
that the educational institution was receiving federal financial assistance at 
the time of the exclusion; and that the wrongful discrimination caused the 
complainant harm.45
Opponents of facility equity employ a textualist interpretation of Title 
IX to deny that the statute offers any protection for transgender students. 
They argue that the term “sex” in the statute and its enforcing regulations 
should be read according to its proposed plain text meaning: strictly “bio-
logical” or “anatomical” sex—essentially predicating identity on genita-
lia.46 They also insist that Congress only ever intended for the statute to 
apply to cisgender students.47 However, neither of these points are support-
ed by dispositive evidence.
If we were restricted only to dictionary definitions, then it would be 
unclear what the ordinary meaning of the term “sex” was at the time of 
drafting. Definitions of the term “sex” at the time of Title IX’s adoption 
seem to blend considerations of biology and gendered traits, which makes 
it difficult to determine whether it should be interpreted inclusively or ex-
clusively.48 Numerous dictionaries at the time did not predicate sex on gen-
italia, but rather a totality of physiology, communal norms, and gender 
44. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2012).
45. See id. § 1687 (defining a “program or activity” as “a department, agency . . . or other instru-
mentality of a State or of a local government . . . [or] a college, university, or other postsecondary 
institution, or a public system of higher education . . . .”); see also Preston v. Virginia ex rel. New River 
Cmty. Coll., 31 F.3d 203, 206 (4th Cir.1994) (citing Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 680 
(1979)).
46. See generally Brief of Petitioner at 26–32, Gloucester County School Board v. G.G., 137 S. 
Ct. 1239 (2017) (No. 16-273), 2017 WL 65477.
47. See generally id. at 32–34.
48. See Sex, AMERICAN COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1109 (1969) (defining “sex” as “the character of 
being either male or female” or “the sum of the anatomical and physiological differences with reference 
to which the male and female are distinguished . . . .”); see also Sex, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW 
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2081 (1971) (defining “sex” as “the sum of the morphological, physio-
logical, and behavioral peculiarities of living beings . . . that in its typical dichotomous occurrence is 
usu[ally] genetically controlled and associated with special sex chromosomes, and that is typically 
manifested as maleness and femaleness . . . .”); Sex, WEBSTER’S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1054 
(1979) (defining “sex” as “the sum of the structural, functional, and behavioral characteristics of living 
beings . . . that distinguish males and females”).
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characteristics.49 But even those which rely purely on external genitalia or 
reproductive function trade in unworkable stereotypes—it is a stretch to say 
that Congress would consider a sterile or castrated cisgender person to no 
longer embody their designated gender.50 Many modern dictionaries also 
retain the trend of considering sex as a sum of various characteristics asso-
ciated with gender identifiers and norms rather than a binary dependent on 
genitalia.51
Congressional purpose is hardly illuminating either. Numerous re-
marks by the sponsor of the statute, Senator Birch Bayh, reflect that at least 
one of the motivations behind the passage of Title IX was to provide pro-
tection to cisgender women in education as a remedy for past discrimina-
tion.52 This goal, though significant, was a subset of a broader desire to 
eliminate all sex discrimination in education whatsoever. In Senator Bayh’s 
words, “Central to my amendment are [provisions] which would prohibit 
discrimination on the basis of sex in federally funded education pro-
grams . . . This portion of the amendment covers discrimination in all areas 
where abuse has been mentioned [including] . . . access to programs within 
the institution . . . .”53
Without any explicit discussion of transgender status, these considera-
tions are largely ambiguous as to how they should be applied to 
transgender students. Facially, they do not necessarily allow or disallow 
transgender students access to appropriate facilities. The broad language of 
the statute and the driving interest of eliminating sex discrimination in gen-
eral may be read to permit a transinclusive reading. By the same token, the 
focus on educational parity for cisgender women in particular, and the lack 
of consideration of transgender students, may indicate otherwise.
49. G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 721 (4th Cir. 2016), cert. 
granted in part, 137 S. Ct. 369 (2016), and vacated and remanded, 137 S. Ct. 1239 (2017). But see Josh
Blackman, Statutory Originalism, JOSH BLACKMAN’S BLOG (Feb. 26, 2017),
http://joshblackman.com/blog/2017/02/26/statutory-originalism/ [https://perma.cc/CN3Z-U7ML] 
(arguing that textual analysis does not produce any ambiguity in Title IX’s definition of “sex”).
50. See, e.g., Sex, AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1187 (1976) (defining “sex” as “[t]he 
property or quality by which organisms are classified according to their reproductive functions”).
51. See Sex, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1583 (10th ed. 2014) (defining “sex” as “[t]he sum of 
the peculiarities of structure and function that distinguish a male from a female organism; gender.”); see 
also Sex, AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1605 (5th ed. 2011) (defining “sex” as “[o]ne’s identity as 
either female or male” or “the collection of characteristics that distinguish female and male”).
52. “[Title IX] is a strong and comprehensive measure which I believe is needed if we are to 
provide women with solid legal protection as they seek education and training for later careers . . . .”
118 CONG. REC. 5806–07 (1972); Senator Birch Bayh, Address at Secretary of Education’s Commis-
sion on Opportunity in Athletics 24 (Aug. 27, 2002), 
https://web.archive.org/web/20081109052950/http://www.ed.gov/about/bdscomm/list/athletics/transcri
pt-082702.pdf [https://perma.cc/2V7A-JXNF].
53. 118 CONG. REC. 5807 (1972).
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This is not dispositive in itself, however: as the Supreme Court ob-
served in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., “statutory prohibi-
tions often go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable 
evils, and it is ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the principal 
concerns of our legislators by which we are governed.”54 Thus, if the text 
itself is ambiguous, and the legislative purpose is not dispositive, one must 
look to relevant jurisprudential principles. These begin with Title VII.
A. The Price Waterhouse Foundation
In the past, courts have relied on Title VII jurisprudence to inform and 
control decisions pertaining to Title IX questions.55 This has significant 
bearing on the question of whether Title IX protects transgender individu-
als, as several federal courts of appeals and numerous federal district courts 
have held that Title VII protections against sex discrimination also apply to 
transgender employees.56 In relevant part, Title VII forbids employers from 
“limit[ing], segregat[ing], or classify[ing] [their] employees or applicants 
for employment in any way which would . . . adversely affect [the individ-
ual’s] status as an employee, because of such individual’s . . . sex.”57
The Supreme Court expanded the concept of sex discrimination to in-
clude gender stereotypes in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.58 In Price Wa-
terhouse, Ann Hopkins, a senior manager of the accounting firm Price 
Waterhouse, sued the firm for rejection of her partnership proposal.59 Hop-
kins alleged that the firm’s decision was based on sex stereotyping in viola-
tion of Title VII.60 Over the course of her evaluation for partnership, 
Hopkins had been criticized by partners for being “macho,” and “overcom-
pensate[ing] for being a woman.”61 Significantly, Hopkins was told to 
54. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998) (rejecting argument that 
Title VII does not prohibit same-sex sexual harassment in the workplace because it was not the “princi-
pal evil” targeted by Congress).
55. See Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 651 (1999) (citing 
Oncale, 523 U.S. at 82—a case involving a Title VII dispute—as controlling authority for a dispositive 
Title IX question); see also Franklin v. Gwinnett Cty. Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 74–75 (1992) (citing 
Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986)—a case involving a Title VII dispute—as 
controlling authority for a Title IX question).
56. See Whitaker ex rel. Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of Educ., 858 F.3d 
1034, 1049 (7th Cir. 2017) (collecting cases).
57. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1) (2012).
58. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
59. Id. at 231–32.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 235.
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“walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear 
make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry.”62
The Court found for Hopkins, holding that a Title VII violation is es-
tablished where sex stereotyping—personal biases as to which traits a par-
ticular gender must adhere to—influenced an adverse employment 
decision.63 The Court explained that where “an employer . . . acts on the 
basis of a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive, or that she must not be, 
[that employer] has acted on the basis of gender.”64 Also, the Court empha-
sized that “‘[i]n forbidding employers to discriminate against individuals 
because of their sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of 
disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes.”‘65
The effect of the Price Waterhouse decision might not be as forceful 
as Justice Brennan’s language suggested, however. Subsequent case law 
has dulled Price Waterhouse’s edge by establishing that reasonable com-
munity standards—or gender norms—may still be enforced by employers 
so long as they are not overly or unequally burdensome.66 Commentators 
have observed that it is unlikely that the Court intended to wholly degender 
all workplaces as a result of its decision.67 This reflects an inherent valua-
tion of gender roles and divisions by Title VII.68
B. The Equal Burdens Test and Permissible Sex Stereotyping
Ensconced within Title VII and Title IX is approval of certain forms 
of sex stereotyping and segregation. For example, Title VII permits em-
ployers to make hiring decisions based on sex where that status “is a bona 
fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal opera-
tion of that particular business or enterprise.”69 A line of cases has also 
emerged which permits the segregation of workplace restrooms by gender 
as well as the enforcement of gendered employee grooming and dress 
codes.70 These cases in turn vindicate Title VII’s valuation of gender roles 
62. Id.
63. Id. at 258.
64. Id. at 250.
65. Id. at 251 (alteration in original) (quoting L.A. Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 
702, 707 n. 13 (1978)).
66. See Baker, supra note 6, at 29–33.
67. Robert Post, Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic of American Antidiscrimination Law, 88 
CAL. L. REV. 1, 20 (2000).
68. Id.
69. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(e) (2012) (emphasis added).
70. See Baker, supra note 6, at 29–33; see also Ben-Asher, supra note 7, at 1210–15, 1225–28.
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and the belief that separate can be equal for the sexes in certain cases.71
This view can be traced back to “separate spheres” ideology: the belief that 
gender identity can only be preserved by separating members of different 
genders wherever possible.72 Some commentators acknowledge that even 
today, segregation of facilities and enforcement of gendered dress codes 
facilitate the reinforcement of gender identity on a personal level.73 Others
observe that certain heteronormative presumptions of privacy and sexual 
assault risks underpin the segregation of prisons and restrooms.74
Despite Price Waterhouse, courts have not adopted the view that gen-
der differentiation cannot exist in the workplace. For example, gendered 
employee dress codes have regularly withstood challenges under Title VII. 
To evaluate the discriminatory effect of a casino’s dress and grooming 
policy, the Ninth Circuit in Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., Inc. ap-
plied what is known as the “equal burdens” test. Under this test, a policy is 
valid if it burdens the sexes equally and does not impede opportunity.75
Darlene Jespersen, a bartender at the sports bar in Harrah’s Reno casino, 
sued under Title VII for sex discrimination after she was terminated for 
failure to comply with Harrah’s uniform, appearance, and grooming stand-
ards.76 The policy required that women wear a certain amount of makeup 
and prohibited men from wearing any.77
Although the casino bar’s dress code was differentiated by gender, the 
court found for Harrah’s and emphasized that the policy was not discrimi-
natory because it did not place a greater burden on one gender compared to 
the other.78 The court explicitly distinguished Harrah’s policy from the 
circumstances in Price Waterhouse, stating that the stereotyping suffered 
by Hopkins interfered with her ability to work; in contrast, conformity with 
the “stereotypical image” of a woman under Harrah’s policy did not “ob-
jectively inhibit a woman’s ability to do [her] job.”79 Significantly, the 
court did not foreclose the possibility that an equally-applied policy could 
71. See Baker, supra note 6, at 30.
72. YOSHINO, supra note 5, at 147–49 (discussing how the “separate spheres” ideology delineated 
gender roles by stereotypes); Terry Kogan, Sex Separation in Public Restrooms: Law, Architecture, and 
Gender, 14 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1, 4–5 (2007).
73. See Kogan, supra note 72.
74. Ben-Asher, supra note 7, at 1192–93.
75. Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 2006).
76. Id. at 1105–06.
77. Id. at 1106.
78. Id. at 1109–10.
79. Id. at 1111–13.
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impermissibly burden a person of either gender, thus giving rise to a Price 
Waterhouse sex-stereotyping claim.80
Thus, as commentators observe, Jespersen stands for the proposition 
that dress and grooming policies are equal and nondiscriminatory for cis-
gender individuals where they reflect and enforce community gender 
norms—the collective whole of personal biases.81 So long as such stereo-
typing does not impose anything beyond an “insignificant effect on em-
ployment opportunities,” that stereotyping does not violate Title VII.82 To
the extent courts have examined employers’ policies under this test, the 
most common have involved requirements that only female employees 
wear revealing outfits.83
Title IX embraces the same enforcement of gender norms through 
several segregation provisions. Exchanges between Senator Bayh and other 
members of Congress during the statute’s drafting indicate that Title IX 
was not meant to force the integration of facilities for men and women, and 
that segregation of restrooms, dormitories, and sports leagues between 
genders is still permissible.84 Similar to the separation of restrooms and 
locker rooms, segregation of student housing by sex is permitted under 
Title IX so long as the facilities are comparable to one another.85 Sex-
specific study-abroad programs are also allowed so long as similar oppor-
tunities are also offered to the other sex.86 Another provision permits seg-
regation of sexual and physical education classes, as well as any 
nonvocational classes or extracurriculars.87 In terms of athletics, Title IX 
demands sex-specific scholarships and teams so long as similar opportuni-
ties are available for the other sex.88
The same equal burdens rationale in Jespersen has been extended to 
school dress and grooming codes as applied to cisgender students. In Hay-
den ex rel. A.H. v. Greensburg Community School Corp., the Seventh Cir-
cuit held that a hair-length policy that required male basketball players to 
80. Id. at 1112.
81. Meredith Johnson Harbach, Sexualization, Sex Discrimination, and Public School Dress 
Codes, 50 U. RICH. L. REV. 1039 (2016); see also Baker, supra note 6, at 29.
82. Dodge v. Giant Food, Inc., 488 F.2d 1333, 1337 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
83. E.g., Carroll v. Talman Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 604 F.2d 1028, 1032–33 (7th Cir. 1979) 
(requiring only female employees to wear uniforms is “disparate treatment,” “demeaning to women,”
and “based on offensive stereotypes”); O’Donnell v. Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse, Inc., 656 F. 
Supp. 263, 266 (S.D. Ohio 1987) (requiring only women to wear uniforms is facially discriminatory).
84. See 117 CONG. REC. 30407.
85. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.32(b) (2017).
86. See id. § 106.31(c)
87. See id. § 106.34(a)–(b).
88. See id. § 106.37; see also id. § 106.41.
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keep their hair shortened to a certain length but which did not impose any 
hair-length requirements whatsoever on female players constituted a prima 
facie case of sex discrimination.89 The court emphasized that “sex-
differentiated standards consistent with community norms may be permis-
sible to the extent they . . . impose[] comparable burdens” on the genders.90
Also, the court acknowledged the shifting basis of a standard based on 
personal biases, noting that “community standards . . . do not remain fixed 
in perpetuity.”91
The equal burdens test’s ability to readapt itself and accommodate 
shifting cultural norms reflects why Ann Hopkins’ loss of advancement in 
Price Waterhouse constituted sex stereotyping, but Darlene Jespersen’s 
termination did not.92 We view the stereotype that women cannot or should 
not be aggressive as outmoded, and consider it burdensome when en-
forced.93 Meanwhile, the view that women commonly do or should wear 
makeup in the workplace is still commonly accepted, and may usually be 
enforced with minimal impact.94 Depending on whether an employer or a 
school enforces the burden creates a degree of difference in whether the 
burden is permissible. Generally, it seems that employers often have valid 
business interests to enforce stereotypes, while the same cannot necessarily 
be said of schools.95 The pertinent question, then, is how these views may 
apply to transgender individuals, as well as whether the equal burdens 
framework can accommodate transgender students.
II. SEX STEREOTYPING AND TRANSGENDER IDENTITY
In recent years, transgender plaintiffs have won several personal ap-
pearance challenges based on a Title VII theory of sex stereotyping. Since 
then, a veritable flood of Title IX challenges to transexclusive school poli-
89. Hayden ex rel. A.H. v. Greensburg Cmty. Sch. Corp., 743 F.3d 569, 580, 583 (7th Cir. 2014).
90. Id. at 581 (citing Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1118 (9th Cir. 2006))
91. Id.
92. See generally Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989); see also Jespersen, 444 
F.3d at 1113.
93. See Baker, supra note 6, at 30.
94. Tavora v. N.Y. Mercantile Exch., 101 F.3d 907, 908 (2d Cir. 1996) (“[H]air length policies 
are not within the statutory goal of equal employment . . . such employment policies have only a de
minimis effect . . . .”).
95. For example, before settling the case, the restaurant chain Hooters argued in Latuga v. Hoot-
ers, Inc. that its policy of hiring only women as waitstaff was permissible as a BFOQ. No. 93 C 7709, 
1994 WL 113079 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 1, 1994). Commentators have observed that, if Hooters’ primary 
business function is viewed as the provision of a sexualized environment, then this argument may have 
merit. Kimberly A. Yuracko, Private Nurses and Playboy Bunnies: Explaining Permissible Sex Dis-
crimination, 92 CAL. L. REV. 147, 204 (2004).
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cies has emerged.96 Courts have historically struggled to understand 
transgender individuals’ identities, which has yielded a scattershot body of 
case law and no straightforward proposition for how statutes like Title VII 
and Title IX protect transgender people. If nothing else, the general trend in 
recent years has hewed towards transinclusivity. While the equal burdens 
test has only been explicitly applied to cisgender people, this trajectory 
suggests that there is a viable synthesis of transgender case law and the 
equal burdens test.
A. Title VII and Transgender Employees
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in Smith v. City of Sa-
lem, Ohio, is demonstrative of a transinclusive construction of sex stereo-
typing.97 Smith, a transsexual98 lieutenant of the Salem Fire Department 
undergoing the beginning stages of transition, received several admonish-
ments from coworkers to the effect that Smith’s “appearance and manner-
isms were not ‘masculine enough.’”99 At the time, Smith had been 
diagnosed with Gender Identity Disorder, the precursor to the modern clas-
sification of gender dysphoria.100 The City’s executive body met and de-
vised a plan to subject Smith to a battery of psychological evaluations, with 
the hope that Smith would not comply, thus justifying Smith’s termina-
tion.101 After Smith received a letter from the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission affirming Smith’s right to sue for discrimination, 
Salem’s Civil Service Commission suspended Smith.102
Smith filed suit in federal district court, asserting claims of sex dis-
crimination under Title VII as well as retaliation.103 The district court dis-
96. See Whitaker ex rel. Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of Educ., 858 F.3d 
1034, 1049 (7th Cir. 2017) (collecting cases).
97. Smith v. City of Salem, Ohio, 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004).
98. Circuit Judge Cole uses the term “transsexual” to refer to the appellant throughout the case. 
See generally id. at 567. On one hand, given that Smith had not undergone reassignment surgery, the 
modern understanding of the differences between the terms “transgender” and “transsexual” might 
indicate that usage of the former here would be more appropriate. Id. at 568. However, this Note recog-
nizes the peril in anachronistically applying terms which have only recently entered common parlance 
to situations and people which existed before the proliferation of such terms. Out of respect for private 
self-determination, this Note will adhere to the terms originally used in the cases cited where appropri-
ate. See Stephen Whittle, A Brief History of Transgender Issues, GUARDIAN (June 2, 2010, 6:49 AM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2010/jun/02/brief-history-transgender-issues 
[https://perma.cc/EP2U-T6M5] (exploring the respective historical usages of the terms “transsexual”
and “transgender”).
99. City of Salem, 378 F.3d at 568.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 568–69.
102. Id. at 569.
103. Id.
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missed Smith’s federal claims and granted judgment on the pleadings.104
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Smith’s suspension 
had been impermissibly motivated by sex stereotypes.105 The court ana-
lyzed Price Waterhouse and stated that it stands for the proposition that the 
term “sex” in Title VII “encompasses both the biological differences be-
tween men and women, and gender discrimination, that is, discrimination 
based on a failure to conform to stereotypical gender norms.”106 The court 
concluded that, as a result, “employers who discriminate against men be-
cause they do wear dresses and makeup, or otherwise act femininely, are 
also engaging in sex discrimination, because the discrimination would not 
occur but for the victim’s sex.”107
The Smith court ironically condemns stereotype-based action in the 
same breath with which it views Smith merely as a man wearing 
makeup.108 While the opinion was likely meant to be restricted to 
transgender people, this rhetoric suggests that cisgender men who do not 
conform to certain gender norms would also be burdened if refused access 
to the women’s restroom.109 Without a societal shift towards integrating 
facilities, this view is untenable. The Tenth Circuit assumed the same view 
of transgender individuals and produced the opposite result.110 In Etsitty v. 
Utah Transit Authority, the court found that the Utah Transit Authority’s 
termination of a transsexual employee for using the restroom that aligned 
with their gender identity did not amount to sex discrimination under Title 
VII.111 According to the court, “[u]se of a restroom designated for the op-
posite sex does not constitute a mere failure to conform to sex stereo-
types.”112 The court thus held that a transsexual plaintiff’s sex-stereotyping 
claim may not qualify as a sufficient burden.113
The Ninth Circuit arguably framed the test with proper acknowledge-
ment of the plaintiff’s gender identity.114 The court held in Kastl v. Mari-
copa County Community College District that a college’s denial of access 
104. Id.
105. Id. at 572.
106. Id. at 573.
107. Id. at 574 (emphasis in original).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. See generally Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2007).
111. Id. at 1224–25.
112. Id. (citing Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enter., Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 875 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001)).
113. Id. at 1225 (citing Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998)).
114. See generally Kastl v. Maricopa Cty. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 325 F. App’x 492, 493 (9th Cir. 
2009).
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to the women’s restroom for an assigned-male-at-birth (AMAB)115 trans-
sexual instructor constituted a prima facie case of sex discrimination.116
The court explained that “[a]fter [Price Waterhouse] . . . it is unlawful to 
discriminate against a transgender (or any other) person because he or she 
does not behave in accordance with an employer’s expectations for men or 
women.”117 Per Jespersen, the Ninth Circuit views gender norms associated 
with one’s sex-assigned-at-birth as being enforceable on cisgender employ-
ees without running afoul of Title VII.118 Curiously, the court did not ex-
plicitly apply the equal burdens test to Kastl, although it is possible that the 
underlying logic of the test influenced the outcome.119 The key aspect of 
this decision is that it suggests that where gender norms associated with 
one’s sex-assigned-at-birth are enforced against a transgender employee, 
that enforcement rises to the level of discrimination.
Some commentators have recognized this as the willingness of some 
courts to move towards a transinclusive accommodation under the equal 
burdens test.120 This may be linked to the fact that transgender individuals 
often suffer from the unique burden of gender dysphoria, which is substan-
tially aggravated by exclusion from appropriate facilities and denial of 
gender identity.121 The Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Hively v. Ivy Tech 
Community College of Indiana also paves the way for this reading.122
There, the court held that Title VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation.123 In its discussion, the court also identified gender non-
conformity as one of the bases for the discrimination.124 Some courts have 
also indicated that the equal burdens doctrine remains intact so long as 
there is some showing of a burden such as gender dysphoria suffered by the 
plaintiff.125 The key potential of a transinclusive equal burdens test is dis-
cussed infra in Part III.
115. “AFAB” and “AMAB” are among several commonly used acronyms for referring to a 
transgender individual’s sex at birth. See Christine Salek, 9 Gender and Sexuality Acronyms You Should 
Learn, MIC (June 29, 2013), https://mic.com/articles/52001/9-gender-and-sexuality-acronyms-you-
should-learn#.Era6ee8h3 [https://perma.cc/7CZQ-APFR].
116. Kastl, 325 F. App’x at 493 (affirming the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the 
College on the basis of insufficient evidence of gender-based discriminatory intent).
117. Id. (first citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989); and then citing 
Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1201–02 (9th Cir. 2000)).
118. See Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 2006).
119. See Kastl, 325 F. App’x 492. 
120. See Ben-Asher, supra note 7, at 1213–14.
121. See Am. Psychological Ass’n, supra note 21; see also WORLD PROF’L ASS’N FOR 
TRANSGENDER HEALTH, supra note 21.
122. Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017).
123. Id. at 346–47.
124. Id.
125. See Schroer v. Billington, 424 F.Supp.2d 203, 213 (D.D.C. 2006).
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B. Title IX and Transgender Students
School appearance cases have only recently begun the path towards a 
transgender identity exception under the equal burdens doctrine. The most 
recent and significant challenge to a transexclusive school restroom policy 
brought on equality grounds has been Gloucester.126 In Gloucester, the 
Fourth Circuit held that a school board’s transexclusive restroom policy 
constituted sex discrimination under Title IX.127 The school granted boys’ 
restroom access to Grimm, an AFAB transgender boy who was diagnosed 
with gender dysphoria and underwent hormone therapy.128 Upon receiving 
complaints from upset members of the school district community, however, 
the Board voted to bar Grimm and any other transgender students from 
using restrooms that corresponded with their gender identity, and instead 
designated a separate unisex restroom to be made available for use.129
The Fourth Circuit acknowledged that Title IX permits certain types 
of sex segregation, including that of restrooms, but ultimately ruled that it 
would defer to the DOE’s interpretation of Title IX.130 Although much of 
its reasoning was couched in deference to the DOE, the court did observe 
that the validity of the agency’s interpretation stemmed from the ambiguity 
of the term “sex” in Title IX.131 The court also discounted privacy concerns 
as policy issues rather than dispositive legal questions.132 Although Circuit 
Judge Floyd did not discuss the weight of Price Waterhouse on the issue, 
Senior Circuit Judge Davis cited the case as favorable controlling precedent 
in his concurring opinion.133
In his dissent, Circuit Judge Niemeyer acknowledged the codification 
of beneficial sex segregation in Title IX and argued that the ruling ran 
roughshod over “custom, culture, and the very demands inherent in human 
nature for privacy and safety, which the separation of such facilities is de-
signed to protect.”134 Judge Niemeyer also insisted that the term “sex” was 
not ambiguous, but was rather only meant to refer to “biological” sex. 
126. See generally G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709 (4th Cir. 2016), 
cert. granted in part, 137 S. Ct. 369 (2016), and vacated and remanded, 137 S. Ct. 1239 (2017). The 
significance of Gloucester is further shown by the sheer volume of transgender-student-rights cases 
brought in its wake. See Whitaker ex rel. Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of Educ., 
858 F.3d 1034, 1049 (7th Cir. 2017) (collecting cases).
127. Gloucester, 822 F.3d 709.
128. Id. at 715–16.
129. Id. at 716–17.
130. Id. at 718, 723.
131. Id. at 721–22.
132. Id. at 723–24.
133. Id. at 727 (Davis, J., concurring).
134. Id. at 731 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting).
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Throughout his dissent, Judge Niemeyer reasoned that communal norms 
and the benefits of sex segregation reinforced his reading of Title IX.135 He
also argued that if transgender students shared restrooms and locker rooms 
with cisgender students, the privacy and safety of cisgender students would 
be compromised.136
Less than a year after Gloucester, courts have already begun to extend 
the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning to other facilities that Title IX protects, such 
as locker rooms. For example, Whitaker featured similar facts to Glouces-
ter: a transgender boy sought a preliminary injunction so that he could use 
the boy’s restroom at his school.137 This time around, however, the Seventh 
Circuit analyzed the issue without deference to an administrative agency; 
rather, it granted the preliminary injunction after an equality theory analy-
sis.138 Similar to Hively, the court stated that discrimination on the basis of 
gender non-conformity likely violates Title IX.139 Yet without reference to 
facility integration, the court’s application of the equality theory allows for 
unintended consequences.
Courts can easily reach the opposite conclusion when analyzing cases 
with the Gloucester and Whitaker equality theory. The Northern District 
Court of Texas in Texas v. United States did exactly that.140 In Texas, the 
court issued a nationwide injunction on enforcement of the DOE’s interpre-
tation of Title IX.141 The court cited Judge Niemeyer’s dissent favorably, 
emphasized that it was “illogical” to extend Title IX protection to 
transgender students, and argued that Title IX’s codification of sex segrega-
tion was meant to protect cisgender students’ privacy.142
As Texas shows, this line of cases rests on an uneven foundation. With 
the rescission of DOE support and the remand of Gloucester, lower courts 
must once again determine whether transgender students have a place in the 
modern Title IX regime. The trajectory of cases like City of Salem, Kastl,
and Whitaker indicate that the soundest method is through the equal bur-
dens test.143
135. See generally id. at 730–39.
136. Id. at 735–36.
137. Whitaker ex rel. Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of Educ., 858 F.3d 1034, 
1038–39 (7th Cir. 2017).
138. Id. at 1049–50.
139. Id.
140. See Texas v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 3d 810, 827–28 (N.D. Tex. 2016).
141. Id. at 836.
142. Id. at 833–34.
143. See generally Whitaker, 858 F.3d at 1048–50; Kastl v. Maricopa Cty. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 325 
F. App’x 492 (9th Cir. 2009); Smith v. City of Salem, Ohio, 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004)
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III. TRANSGENDER STUDENT FACILITY EQUITY
The equality theory of transgender student facility equity, on its own, 
may not be sufficient in coming litigation without addressing the concept of 
permissible stereotyping. Under this theory, the denial of access to re-
strooms is based on stereotyped expectations of the requisite congruence 
between gender identity and physiology, and thus constitutes sex discrimi-
nation under Title IX. Some courts have signaled willingness to find that 
Title IX protects transgender students on the merits. These concessions, 
however, have been drawn in the ambit of favorable guidance by the DOE, 
which has since been rescinded.144 The Fourth Circuit and other like-
minded circuits may be willing to go along with the equality theory; but the 
argument will also inevitably fail with courts that share views with the 
Northern District Court of Texas. Instead, courts must reconcile the core 
inconsistencies of the equality theory.
A. Equality Theory
As an initial matter, textual analysis of Title IX poses little threat to 
the weight or validity of the equality theory. Undoubtedly, courts like those 
in Etsitty and Texas may interpret the text of Title VII and Title IX as being 
completely unambiguous because, in their view, the term “sex” was only 
ever intended to mean “biological” sex.145 As discussed ante, however, 
dictionary definitions at the time of Title IX’s passing were largely con-
flicting, with sex defined at times only in reference to genitalia or anatomy 
and at others with consideration of behavioral and chromosomal traits.146
As to plain meaning, it can hardly be said that a consensus existed which 
confined the term to a simple genital-derived dichotomy. A straightforward 
and practical application of such a standard is not readily apparent either. 
The court in Gloucester acknowledged the difficulty and posed the ques-
tion of “which restroom would a transgender individual who had under-
gone sex reassignment surgery use? What about an intersex individual? 
What about an individual born with X–X–Y sex chromosomes?”147
144. Somashekhar et al., supra note 39.
145. Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1222 (10th Cir. 2007); Texas, 201 F. Supp. 3d at 
832–33.
146. See supra text accompanying note 48; see also supra text accompanying note 51.
147. G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 720–21 (4th Cir. 2016), cert. 
granted in part, 137 S. Ct. 369 (2016), and vacated and remanded, 137 S. Ct. 1239 (2017). “Intersex”
is a term which refers to various manifestations of an individual’s sex characteristic not falling squarely 
into a traditional male/female dichotomy. See WORLD HEALTH ORG., GENDER AND GENETICS 1, 2, 
http://www.who.int/genomics/gender/en/index1.html [https://perma.cc/3N3D-X6LN].
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Legislative purpose is not dispositive either. The sponsors of the stat-
ute appear to have envisioned a liberal application of its substance.148 Even
if the sponsors did not consider transgender students in drafting the statute, 
there’s little to indicate that it is meant to be exclusive. Besides, the Su-
preme Court has expanded the application of Title VII (and, by extension, 
Title IX) to issues not originally contemplated by its drafters, such as same-
sex sexual harassment.149
On first impression, then, the equality theory is properly drawn from 
Title VII jurisprudence, which informs analysis of issues under Title IX.150
As the Court held in Price Waterhouse, sex stereotyping may constitute 
impermissible sex discrimination.151 In other words, an adverse action tak-
en against someone because they transgress certain gender norms associat-
ed with sex may constitute sex discrimination.152 How this applies to 
transgender people may seem straightforward, although courts have strug-
gled to apply the concept evenly or with proper consideration for gender 
identity. For example, in City of Salem the court observed that “employers 
who discriminate against men because they do wear dresses and makeup, 
or otherwise act femininely, are also engaging in sex discrimination, be-
cause the discrimination would not occur but for the victim’s sex.”153 On its
face, this reasoning would suggest that, for example, a cisgender man who 
wears a dress should be allowed to use the women’s restroom, even if that 
was not the court’s intent.
Putting aside the courts’ historical struggle to understand the concept 
of gender identity, cases like City of Salem suggest a shift towards under-
standing that discrimination against transgender people arises from the 
perception that an individual’s gender identity is incongruous with their 
assigned sex.154 Under the equality theory, the school acts upon a stereo-
typed view of how masculine men must be and how effeminate women 
must be when it denies appropriate facility access to transgender students. 
To deny a transgender person access to a restroom because of their as-
signed sex is therefore an act of stereotyping based on a belief of what 
norms and characteristics to which a particular sex must adhere. Both Sen-
148. See supra text accompanying note 52.
149. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998) (rejecting argument that 
Title VII does not prohibit same-sex sexual harassment in the workplace because it was not the “princi-
pal evil” targeted by Congress).
150. See supra text accompanying note 55.
151. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250–52 (1989).
152. Id.
153. Smith v. City of Salem, Ohio, 378 F.3d 566, 574 (6th Cir. 2004) (emphasis in original).
154. Id.
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ior Circuit Judge Davis in his concurrence in Gloucester and Circuit Judge 
Williams in Whitaker indicated that such a construction of Price Water-
house also extends to Title IX. This would mean that in the school context, 
denial of appropriate facility access to transgender students would consti-
tute impermissible sex discrimination.155
The problem with this argument is that Title IX enforces gender norms 
through the equal burdens test. Under the test, gender-differentiated poli-
cies are permitted so long as they vindicate communal biases and do not 
unduly burden or impede opportunity.156 Thus, requiring a female casino 
bartender to wear makeup does not constitute sex discrimination because it 
conforms to certain gender norms and does not impede her ability to obtain 
employment or perform her job.157 In contrast, denying partner status to a 
woman because she is aggressive or authoritative constitutes a burden: it is 
an impediment to opportunity leveraged on the basis of outmoded views of 
how women can and cannot act.158 The court in Etsitty took this implicit 
view and held that such values barred transgender employees from access-
ing restrooms that corresponded with their gender identities.159 There, the 
court reasoned that it is not an impediment to a man’s employment to be 
barred from the women’s restroom, thus failing to rise to a discriminatory 
degree of sex stereotyping.160
Rather than formulate a transinclusive construction of the equal bur-
dens test, some would argue that the more equitable path is to dispose of 
gendered facilities entirely and integrate.161 They argue that sex segregation 
produces a hierarchy of opportunity that inherently disadvantages wom-
en.162 Under this view, the modern construction of equality theory cannot 
abide sex stereotyping or strict adherence to gender norms.163 Any divi-
sions based upon such communal biases are inherently discriminatory.164
155. Whitaker ex rel. Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of Educ., 858 F.3d 1034, 
1049–50 (7th Cir. 2017).
156. Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1113 (9th Cir. 2006).
157. See id. at 1110.
158. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250 (1989); see also Baker, supra note 6, at 
30.
159. Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1224–25 (10th Cir. 2007).
160. Id. at 1225.
161. See, e.g., Ruth Colker, Public Restrooms: Flipping the Default Rules, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 145, 
177–79 (2017).
162. See id. at 167–69 (citing Mary Anne Case, Why Not Abolish the Laws of Urinary Segrega-
tion?, in TOILET: PUBLIC RESTROOMS AND THE POLITICS OF SHARING 211, 215–16 (Harvey Molotch & 
Laura Noren eds., 2010)).
163. See Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The Disaggrega-
tion of Sex from Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 3 (1995).
164. Id. at 95.
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There is some token movement towards this solution; a not insignificant 
number of schools, businesses, and government locations now offer unisex 
facilities.165 As the Seventh Circuit in Hayden noted, cultural norms can 
shift over time; the favorable perception of beneficial sex segregation ad-
justs accordingly.166 In turn, law must adapt to these changes—after all, 
“doctrinal formulations are less important to the law’s development than 
the cultural experience in which those laws are embedded.”167 Cases like 
Gloucester and Whitaker indicate a growing willingness on the part of 
courts to favor transgender students and scrutinize schools’ efforts to ex-
clude them.168
Regardless of the merits of integration, advocates for transgender stu-
dent facility equity have not adopted this view. Whether out of strategic 
formulation or genuine disinterest, advocates in cases like Gloucester have
explicitly denied seeking integration.169 It also seems distinctly unlikely 
that most courts would adopt this approach. As some commentators have 
argued, there is an understanding that statutes like Title VII and Title IX do 
not mandate “a world of sexless individuals.”170 Many derive value from
gendered institutions like sex-segregated restrooms as well: the separation 
reifies gender by rendering it as identifiably discrete from another gen-
der.171 Separation also fosters a safe haven from the gaze of another gender, 
where certain performative aspects of gender may fall away, if only for a 
brief time.172 While in no way categorical, many transgender individuals 
also benefit from this separation, as accessing a restroom which corre-
sponds with one’s gender identity reinforces self-perception of that identi-
ty.173 In a certain capacity, integration frustrates these benefits in a 
165. See, e.g., Sharon Bernstein, California Requires Single-Stall Public Bathrooms to Be Open to 
All, REUTERS (Sept. 29, 2016, 6:25 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-california-lgbt-bathrooms-
idUSKCN11Z34H [https://perma.cc/7QNN-RYBC].
166. Hayden ex rel. A.H. v. Greensburg Cmty. Sch. Corp., 743 F.3d 569, 581 (7th Cir. 2014).
167. YOSHINO, supra note 5, at 176 (explaining Oliver Wendell Holmes’s statement “[t]he life of 
the law has not been logic: it has been experience”).
168. See generally Whitaker ex rel. Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of Educ., 
858 F.3d 1034, 1049–50 (7th Cir. 2017); G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709 
(4th Cir. 2016), cert. granted in part, 137 S. Ct. 369 (2016), and vacated and remanded, 137 S. Ct. 
1239 (2017).
169. See generally Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, Gloucester, 822 F.3d 709 (No. 15-2056).
170. See Post, supra note 67, at 20.
171. See Kogan, supra note 72 at 8–9 (discussing how “architectural dichotomies” inherently 
reinforce masculine and feminine norms).
172. See id. at 49 (discussing how “Victorian values of modesty” influenced the use of restrooms 
as “private space[s] . . . hidden from public gaze”).
173. See Am. Psychological Ass’n, supra note 21; see also WORLD PROF’L ASS’N FOR 
TRANSGENDER HEALTH, supra note 21; see also Nico Lang, What It’s Like to Use a Public Bathroom 
While Trans, ROLLING STONE (Mar. 31, 2016), http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/what-its-
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trajectory towards what some commentators describe as an androgynous—
and notably masculine—mean.174 While we may eventually move towards 
integration, the present requires some stopgap measure that accommodates 
gendered spaces, communal norms, and transgender individuals all at once.
B. Equal Burdens Test Synthesis
Courts must reconcile the tension between the equality theory and Ti-
tle IX’s valuation of societally-approved sex stereotyping by showing that 
the multifaceted harm borne by transgender students constitutes unduly 
burdensome stereotyping. This synthesis combines a similar construction of 
the equality theory’s sex-stereotyping standard with the equal burdens test 
and a harm standard tailored to transgender individuals’ unique experience. 
Under this construction, denying transgender students access to appropriate 
facilities because they do not fully conform to the norms of their gender 
identity constitutes sex stereotyping, similar to that in Price Waterhouse.175
Unlike the court’s approach in City of Salem, this does not give credence to 
the viewpoint of the discriminating individual who considers a transgender 
woman as a man presenting as a woman and vice versa.176 Instead, similar 
to the court’s view in Kastl, it vindicates the victim’s identity by measuring 
stereotyping relative to how the victim is perceived to conform to the 
norms associated with their gender.
This alone might permit nonconforming cisgender students improper 
facility access, but the distinguishing difference lies in the burden element 
of the equal burdens test. The test functions to vindicate communal norms 
so long as enforcement of such norms do not impede a student’s education-
al opportunities.177 For cisgender students, there is no burden in being de-
nied access to a facility or program that does not correspond with their 
gender identity. These students still have access to appropriate restrooms, 
locker rooms, and sports leagues without shame or psychological harm.
The same cannot be said of transgender students. Denial of access to 
appropriate facilities is a complex harm that constitutes an impermissible 
impediment on the enjoyment of the educational institution. Because of the 
like-to-use-a-public-bathroom-while-trans-20160331 [https://perma.cc/DL4D-QF55] (“Now I have a 
different relationship to bathrooms. I actually feel like it gives me power.”). 
174. See Baker, supra note 6, at 31–32 n.171 (citing Kimberly Yuracko, Trait Discrimination as 
Sex Discrimination: An Argument Against Neutrality, 83 TEX. L. REV. 167, 172 (2004); also discussing 
the case of Shannon Faulkner, who withdrew from The Citadel after being forced to get a buzz cut and 
receiving substantial harassment thereafter). 
175. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250 (1989).
176. See Smith v. City of Salem, Ohio, 378 F.3d 566, 574 (6th Cir. 2004).
177. See Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 2006).
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unique nature of the harm experienced by transgender people, the burden’s 
severity should be evaluated on a scale drawn from sexual harassment ju-
risprudence, which acknowledges the student’s perception.178 In short: “the 
objective severity of the [burden] should be judged from the perspective of 
a reasonable [transgender person] in the plaintiff’s position.”179 To meet 
this standard, it is crucial to define the harm that transgender students suffer 
from denial of access and identify why it rises to the level of an impermis-
sible burden. It is in equal parts a dignitary harm, a psychological harm, 
and, in certain cases, a physical harm.
First, denial of access deprives transgender people of the autonomy of 
self-expression and self-identification.180 Justice Kennedy observed in 
Obergefell that a liberty interest exists in “certain personal choices central 
to individual dignity and autonomy, including . . . choices that define per-
sonal identity . . . .”181 By virtue of public (or at least communal) access, 
school restrooms and locker rooms are not truly “private” spaces—not in 
the way that one’s home restroom and bedroom are private. Rather, there is 
an expectation of moderate personal privacy: stalls, privacy strips, curtains, 
and the like partially conceal, but do not fully shield from awareness and 
perception.182 The very act of entering a restroom or locker room is a view-
able public act that announces the gender of the entrant. Through sex seg-
regation, restrooms “create a system of surveillance and policing of public 
spaces based on subjective assessments of a person’s gender and gender 
expression.”183
A Rolling Stone interview of several transgender people examined this 
phenomenon; Brynn Tannehill, a transgender woman, noted that “[i]f you 
178. See e.g., Patricia H. v. Berkeley Unified Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1288, 1296 (N.D. Cal. 
1993).
179. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998) (citing Harris v. Forklift 
Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1997)).
180. As defined by Professor Yoshino, autonomy being “the freedom to elaborate [one’s] authentic 
sel[f,] rather than . . . a rigid notion of what constitutes an authentic . . . identity.” YOSHINO, supra note 
5, at 93. 
181. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2597 (2015); see also YOSHINO, supra note 5, at 71 
(“[I]f there is a ‘right to be,’ there is a ‘right to say what one is.’”). Analysis of a potential Due Process 
claim for transgender student facility equity is beyond the scope of this Note. For a discussion of 
transgender rights in light of Obergefell, see generally David B. Cruz, Transgender Rights After Ober-
gefell, 84 UMKC L. REV. 693 (2016).
182. Julie Beck, The Private Lives of Public Bathrooms, ATLANTIC (Apr. 16, 2014), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2014/04/the-private-lives-of-public-bathrooms/360497/ 
[https://perma.cc/62T4-8UB8] (discussing public-restroom-related anxiety and various “social rituals”
practiced to mitigate such discomfort).
183. Jody L. Herman, Gendered Restrooms and Minority Stress: The Public Regulation of Gender 
and its Impact on Transgender People’s Lives, 19 J. PUB. MGMT. & SOC. POL’Y 65, 77 (2013) (citing 
SHEILA L. CAVANAGH, QUEERING BATHROOMS: GENDER, SEXUALITY, AND THE HYGIENIC 
IMAGINATION (2010)).
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walk in [to a restroom] and you’re presenting as female . . . you walk into 
the men’s room and you’ve immediately identified yourself as a lost cis-
gender woman . . . or you walk in and you stay and that immediately marks 
you as transgender . . . .”184 Similarly, Gavin Grimm’s banishment to a 
single-stall unisex restroom separate from the student body functionally 
“outed” him to other students.185 Grimm describes this aspect in that he 
“did not choose to announce to the news media that [he is] transgender. 
[His] school board made that decision for [him].”186 In this way, a school 
that forces a transgender student to use a restroom that does not align with 
their gender identity also eradicates that student’s right to self-determine. 
Thus, in denial of access to proper facilities, there also resides a hostility to 
transgender students’ “right . . . to define and express their identity.”187
The burden of denial is also commonly identified as a psychological 
harm. Gender dysphoria in particular often manifests as “a marked differ-
ence between [an] individual’s expressed/experienced gender and the gen-
der others would assign [them].”188 Typically, gender-affirming 
socialization is key to assuaging the harmful effects of dysphoria.189 Denial 
of access to proper facilities denies beneficial socialization and aggravates 
the substantial distress inherent to dysphoria.190 This is precisely the burden 
imposed when Grimm is denied access to the boys’ restroom.191 Grimm has 
since described this experience as struck through with humiliation and pain
from having to “hold it” to avoid using the improper restroom.192 In his 
words, “[e]very day brings that little bit of extra planning and that nagging 
feeling that someone is going to find a new way to single me out.”193 This 
distress colors a student’s entire educational experience and denies enjoy-
ment of the benefits of the institution. A student can hardly be expected to 
go through the school day without using the restroom—but by forcing 
184. Lang, supra note 173.
185. See G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 732–33 (4th Cir. 2016), 
cert. granted in part, 137 S. Ct. 369 (2016), and vacated and remanded, 137 S. Ct. 1239 (2017).
186. Grimm, supra note 15.
187. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2593 (2015).
188. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 19.
189. See O’Donnabhain v. Comm’r, 134 T.C. 34, 38 (2010); see also WORLD PROF’L ASS’N FOR 
TRANSGENDER HEALTH, supra note 21 (“During this time, patients should present consistently, on a 
day-to-day basis and across all settings of life, in their desired gender role.”).
190. See Am. Psychological Ass’n, supra note 21; see also WORLD PROF’L ASS’N FOR 
TRANSGENDER HEALTH, supra note 21.
191. See G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 716–17 (4th Cir. 2016), 
cert. granted in part, 137 S. Ct. 369 (2016), and vacated and remanded, 137 S. Ct. 1239 (2017).
192. Grimm, supra note 15.
193. Id.
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transgender students to use restrooms which invoke harmful psychological 
distress, this is the precise result.
The culmination of these harms can lead to the threat and actualization 
of physical injury. Studies have found that in the school setting, facility 
denial bears a statistically significant relationship to suicidality among 
transgender students.194 Beyond common ailments related to distress and 
anxiety, many transgender people like Grimm develop urinary tract infec-
tions from being unable to use the restroom.195 Alain Kupec, a transgender 
woman, described in an interview her experience as “wondering if people 
are looking at [her], if [she’s] going to be forced to use the wrong restroom, 
and if it’s going to jeopardize [her] personal safety.”196 In her interview, 
Erica Lachowitz stated that, after being assaulted and molested she was 
told by police that she would not have been attacked “if [she wasn’t] wear-
ing a dress and trying to fool men.”197 By forcing transgender students to 
use restrooms not associated with their gender identity, schools place those 
students at substantial risk of physical harm.
These individual harms interact and amass into a cumulative burden 
that constitutes impermissible discrimination under the equal burdens test. 
As Mitch Kellaway stated in his Rolling Stone interview, “[i]t’s not just 
bathrooms. It is locker rooms. It is getting misgendered by your professor. 
It’s all sorts of little worries you have throughout the day that have this 
cumulative effect . . . .”198 The extreme psychological distress and damage 
to socialization experienced by transgender students—determined from the 
perspective of the reasonable transgender person—under such a regime 
functionally deprives them of an essential facet of their education. The 
temporal nature of transition relative to dysphoria would require that, in 
such cases, the school administration receive actual or constructive notice 
of the burden imposed upon the student. Drawing again from Title VII 
jurisprudence, this would require either that the burden on transgender 
students be “so pervasive as to warrant an inference” that the school knew 
of it, or that someone informed the administration of the burden on a par-
194. Herman, supra note 183, at 66; Kristie L. Seelman, Transgender Adults’ Access to College 
Bathrooms and Housing and the Relationship to Suicidality, 63 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 1378, 1396 (2016) 
(“Findings indicate relationships between denial of access to bathrooms . . . and increased risk of sui-
cidality . . . .”).
195. See G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 717 (4th Cir. 2016), cert. 
granted in part, 137 S. Ct. 369 (2016), and vacated and remanded, 137 S. Ct. 1239 (2017); see also 
Herman, supra note 183, at 75–76.
196. Lang, supra note 184.
197. Id.
198. Id.
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ticular student.199 The latter case is common: for example, Grimm in 
Gloucester directly informed the school administration of his transition and 
the accommodations which would be necessary.200
This construction of the equal burdens test thus harmonizes the direc-
tion of cases like City of Salem, Kastl, and Whitaker with the principles of 
gender norm enforcement within Title IX. Similar to how Ann Hopkins 
bore a sex-stereotyping burden in Price Waterhouse by being denied ad-
vancement for perceived masculine traits, Grimm was subject to a burden 
in Gloucester when he was denied access to the only restroom which would 
not compromise his mental health and physical safety.201 It triumphs over 
middling equality demands, and instead focuses on “the legitimacy of the 
social demands made on” transgender students and “impel[s] courts to look 
at difference in life as it is lived.”202 It also proves that the dispute over 
bathrooms is not a dispute over bathrooms at all. Rather, it is a concerted 
effort to deny transgender students the right to self-identify and exist in a 
public setting. Thus, schools must provide transgender students access to 
facilities that correspond with their gender identity.
C. Balancing Burdens
Courts will also need to address potential burdens this may place on 
cisgender students and prove their illusory nature. In particular, courts like 
in Etsitty and Texas have indicated that they view transgender people as 
inherently threatening to the privacy and safety of cisgender people.203
Judge Niemeyer’s dissent in Gloucester, for example, relies on the proposi-
tion that there is a particular and unique right to privacy “such that [one’s] 
nude or partially nude body, genitalia, and other private parts are not ex-
posed to persons of the opposite biological sex.”204 However, as the majori-
ty in Gloucester observed, this view rests in part on an antiquated 
presumption that sexual attraction inheres a propensity to surveil and vio-
late the privacy of the objects of sexual attraction.205 Schools that seek to 
protect students’ privacy likely already have amenities like toilet stalls, 
urinal privacy strips, and shower privacy curtains. Those that do not al-
199. Kalich v. AT & T Mobility, LLC, 679 F.3d 464, 474 (6th Cir. 2012).
200. Gloucester, 822 F.3d at 715.
201. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250 (1989); see also Gloucester, 822 F.3d at 
716–17.
202. YOSHINO, supra note 5, at 182.
203. See Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1226–27 (10th Cir. 2007); see also Texas v. 
United States, 201 F. Supp. 3d 810, 833 (N.D. Tex. 2016).
204. Gloucester, 822 F.3d at 734 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting).
205. See id. at 723–24 n.11.
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ready protect the privacy of cisgender students are able to pursue such up-
grades similar to the Gloucester school.206 When transgender students use 
the restroom, they do not do so to surveil others; they do so to use the re-
stroom. They also do not undermine the way in which restrooms reify gen-
der for cisgender students: boys emerging from the boys’ restroom are 
secure in their gender identity, regardless of the presence of a transgender 
student.
The safety and privacy of women, in particular, qualifies as a theme 
among opponents of appropriate transgender student facility access. These 
objectors often frame the issue as the need to protect women from the lech-
erous machinations of men.207 Typically, this is coupled with the assertion 
that appropriate facility access enables cisgender men to arbitrarily declare 
themselves to be women (or disguise themselves as such) to surveil and 
assault women in restrooms and locker rooms.208 Protection of women 
from assault is an undeniably valid interest.209 Considering that 20% of 
women are raped at some point in their lifetimes and 91% of total sexual 
assault victims are women, there is a genuine need to ensure women’s safe-
ty.210
But this argument disingenuously presumes that transgender women 
are “actually” men pretending to be women, however, and that transgender 
identity is rooted in sexual perversion and deviancy.211 This reflects the 
view of gender identity as a “sexual preference” akin to sexual orienta-
tion.212 History disposes with this fear: transgender people are not suddenly 
using restrooms which correspond with their gender identity for the first 
time, but have instead been doing so for decades without a single recorded 
case of an assault perpetrated by a transgender individual.213 Access to 
206. Id. at 716.
207. See Colker, supra note 161, at 171.
208. See Alexandra Brodsky, Opinion, Don’t Use Girls as Props to Fight Trans Rights, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 27, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/27/opinion/dont-use-girls-as-props-to-fight-
trans-rights.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/NE7R-SWYE] (accusing the North Carolina legislature of 
“rel[ying] on a dangerous myth that prohibiting discrimination against transgender people would allow 
predatory men to enter women’s restrooms” in drafting House Bill 2).
209. See generally SHEILA L. CAVANAGH, QUEERING BATHROOMS: GENDER, SEXUALITY, AND 
THE HYGIENIC IMAGINATION 73 (2010).
210. NAT’L SEXUAL VIOLENCE RES. CTR., STATISTICS ABOUT SEXUAL VIOLENCE (2015),
http://www.nsvrc.org/sites/default/files/publications_nsvrc_factsheet_media-packet_statistics-about-
sexual-violence_0.pdf  [https://perma.cc/Q463-TCK7].
211. See 162 CONG. REC. E1288 (2016) (statement of Rep. John Duncan opposing facility equity 
for transgender individuals) [hereinafter Duncan Statement].
212. Id.
213. See Stevie Borrello, Sexual Assault and Domestic Violence Organizations Debunk ‘Bathroom 
Predator Myth,’ ABC NEWS (Apr. 22, 2016, 7:15 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/US/sexual-assault-
domestic-violence-organizations-debunk-bathroom-predator/story?id=38604019 
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appropriate restrooms by transgender people has been permitted in several 
states with the same results.214 There is no mutual exclusivity in protecting 
privacy and allowing transgender individuals appropriate facility access; 
statutory prohibitions of assault, harassment, and violations of privacy still 
exist, after all.
This does not preclude the possibility of any transgender individual 
ever assaulting or surveilling someone in a restroom, but it does reflect that 
such an incident would be wholly unprecedented. The fact that transgender 
people are commonly subject to harassment and violence in restrooms in-
stead indicates that the privacy violations predicted by opponents of 
transgender facility equity have been, thus far, solely directed towards 
transgender individuals.215 In certain cases, forcing assigned-male-at-birth 
transgender students in particular to use restrooms which correspond with 
their sex-assigned-at-birth may put them at a higher risk of assault and 
harassment.216 Claims of privacy violations in large part seem to be prema-
ture, if not wholly manufactured.217
The common response has been to advocate for separate unisex facili-
ties, but this approach is burdened with its own set of issues as well. In 
Gloucester, for example, Grimm viewed such separation from the student
body as a wellspring of stigma, reinforcing the “otherness” of his identity 
and functionally “outing” him to other students, where they might not have 
[https://perma.cc/XFS4-VURD] (“[T]he ‘reality is that most everyone has shared a bathroom with a 
trans person and nothing has happened.’”).
214. See id. (“Over 200 municipalities and 18 states have nondiscrimination laws protecting 
transgender people’s access to facilities consistent with the gender they live every day . . . .”).
215. See Duncan Statement, supra note 211; see also DAVID CANTOR ET AL., WESTAT, REPORT ON 
THE AAU CAMPUS CLIMATE SURVEY ON SEXUAL ASSAULT AND SEXUAL MISCONDUCT 50 (2015), 
https://www.aau.edu/sites/default/files/%40%20Files/Climate%20Survey/AAU_Campus_Climate_Surv
ey_12_14_15.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y8WW-7SN5] (“Rates of sexual assault and misconduct are highest 
among undergraduate . . . [students] identifying as transgender, genderqueer, non-conforming, question-
ing, and as something not listed on the survey . . . .”).
216. See National Consensus Statement of Anti-Sexual Assault and Domestic Violence Organiza-
tions in Support of Full and Equal Access for the Transgender Community, NAT’L TASK FORCE TO END
SEXUAL & DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN (Apr. 21, 2016), 
http://endsexualviolence.org/files/NTFNationalConsensusStmtTransAccessWithSignatoriesUpdated4-
29-16.pdf [https://perma.cc/M2B9-RH83] (“[W]e oppose any law that would jeopardize the safety of 
transgender people by forcing them into restrooms that do not align with the gender they live every 
day.”).
217. See Curtis M. Wong, Teen Says She’ll Fail High School if Trans Students Use Her Locker 
Room, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 31, 2016, 9:14 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/pennsylvania-teen-trans-
students_us_57c5afa1e4b0cdfc5ac96a81? [https://perma.cc/4RSC-PHKB] (high school student claim-
ing that she will be constructively barred from completing high school if transgender students are 
allowed appropriate restroom and locker room access. When asked about the lack of evidence of any 
transgender students actually attending her school, the student responded: “How would you know?”).
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otherwise viewed him as such.218 While schools may argue that a single-
stall unisex restroom is meant for all students, cisgender and transgender 
alike, it is likely that such an installation will become a target for tran-
sphobia-rooted vandalism.
Transgender students are subjected daily to a unique mixture of anxie-
ty, dignitary and privacy violation, and threat of physical harm. The im-
mense burden this places on transgender students wholly impedes access to 
educational benefits and the attendant qualities of healthy student life. The 
healthy development of children requires preservation of bodily autonomy 
and freedom from surveillance; this is no less true for transgender stu-
dents.219 The fact that positive socialization and acceptance of one’s gender 
identity are often crucial to the mental health and security of transgender 
children evinces the importance of facilitating their privacy in these set-
tings.220 Regardless of whether integration may assuage these harms, it is 
unlikely to come any time soon. The equal burdens test already intrinsic to 
Title VII and Title IX jurisprudence provides the tool to reconcile permis-
sible sex stereotyping with transgender students’ autonomy and right to 
self-identification.
CONCLUSION
By itself, the equality theory is not capable of vindicating the rights of 
transgender students. Equality theory does not explain why it matters 
whether facility denial is rooted in a stereotype. It also ignores the fact that 
certain stereotypes are not only protected, but are indeed encouraged under 
Title VII and Title IX. The equal burdens doctrine, in contrast, contem-
plates these countervailing considerations and shows that transgender stu-
dents’ autonomy can be protected without dispensing of law reliant upon 
collective communal biases.
The equal burdens doctrine also proves that the dispute over 
transgender students’ access to appropriate facilities is largely pretextual. 
Courts like those in Texas and Etsitty have naturally focused on the specif-
ics of restrooms and locker rooms, as well as how those facilities reify gen-
der. But the relative burdens placed on transgender students due to facility 
218. See G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 732 (4th Cir. 2016), cert. 
granted in part, 137 S. Ct. 369 (2016), and vacated and remanded, 137 S. Ct. 1239 (2017); see also
YOSHINO, supra note 5, at 68 (“[O]uting seemed uncomfortably close to the forced acknowledgement 
exacted by homophobes . . . .”).
219. See Am. Psychological Ass’n, supra note 21; see also WORLD PROF’L ASS’N FOR 
TRANSGENDER HEALTH, supra note 21.
220. See Am. Psychological Ass’n, supra note 21; see also WORLD PROF’L ASS’N FOR 
TRANSGENDER HEALTH, supra note 21.
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denial go far beyond “holding it;” denial of proper facility access is, in 
itself, a denial of autonomy. It is crucial that courts employ the equal bur-
dens test and recognize that this is not simply a “transgender bathroom 
dispute”? it is a struggle to defend transgender students’ right to exist.
